The relationship between morality and well-being is a significant topic in moral philosophy, proposed since the inception of
Eastern and Western philosophies, and has sparked considerable thought and discussion. This article refers to the “beliefs about
how morality and well-being are related” as “beliefs about congruent good” (BCG). Exploring the content of BCG is of great
importance, whether from abstract philosophical thoughts or concrete practical applications. In terms of thought, the issue of
the morality-well-being relationship involves the nature and criteria of morality and well-being. In terms of application, moral
education, well-being education, and public policy often cite the discourse of BCG.
Previous psychological research on the relationship between morality and well-being can be divided into two research
paradigms: well-being theories and justice beliefs. The well-being theories paradigm attempts to identify the actual relationship
between well-being and morality, thereby establishing constructs and collecting empirical data. The justice beliefs paradigm
approaches from the perspective of individual subjective beliefs, suspending the issue of the actual relationship between
morality and well-being, and exploring the cognitive and psychological mechanisms of justice beliefs. However, this article
argues that neither research paradigm has provided an effective and clear analysis of BCG, thus limiting the development and
application of the theory. The reason may be that the current psychological research paradigms on the morality-well-being
relationship are insufficiently inclusive of the philosophy of BCG, leading to partial or simplified explanations of BCG.
The well-being theories paradigm can be further divided into two main approaches: The hedonic well-being perspective
and the eudaimonic well-being perspective. These differing viewpoints form two different constructs of well-being: Subjective
well-being and psychological well-being. The hedonic perspective emphasizes “subjective well-being,” which refers to an
individual’s subjective experiences and mental states; the eudaimonic perspective emphasizes “psychological well-being,”
which refers to an individual’s objective psychological functions and traits. The hedonic perspective adopts an instrumental
relationship stance to explore the relationship between morality and well-being, with the most common research topic being the
relationship between altruism and subjective well-being. Supporters of the eudaimonic perspective believe that the ideal state of
humans is quite diverse, thus proposing many theories to describe various aspects of psychological well-being, and particularly
emphasizing the relationship between virtue and well-being, conducting numerous empirical studies to examine whether there is
a positive correlation or causal relationship between the two.
This article argues that the eudaimonic perspective on well-being has several shortcomings when exploring the relationship
between morality and well-being. First, the eudaimonic perspective is based on the philosophical foundation of virtue ethics,
with a specific normative ethical stance that presupposes the “congruence of morality and well-being,” making it difficult to explore other directions of BCG. Second, the “virtue” in the eudaimonic perspective, as a core concept of virtue ethics or
character strengths, does not entirely equate to “morality,” but broadly refers to various domains of excellent attributes. More
clearly, in the eudaimonic well-being theory, the meaning of “virtue” is closer to “well-being,” which is a necessary component
of well-being. Furthermore, although the eudaimonic well-being perspective describes some existing phenomena of congruence
between morality and well-being, it does not explore how people interpret the relationship between morality and well-being,
including explanations of congruent and incongruent phenomena. Fourth, the eudaimonic well-being perspective defines wellbeing
using certain normative standards but finds it difficult to propose a common standard to measure theoretical discrepancies.
Compared to the eudaimonic perspective, the hedonic perspective does not presuppose a specific stance on the morality-wellbeing
relationship but thus needs to propose theories to explain the unstable relationship between moral behavior and subjective
well-being.
Justice beliefs include the belief in a just world and supernatural beliefs such as karma. These beliefs all involve the concept
of “fair reciprocity”: Repaying those who help oneself with kindness, honesty, and cooperation, or distributing benefits to those
who deserve them. Conversely, those who violate moral behavior are avoided or punished. These beliefs are reflected in many
social interactions, whether in the intuitive preferences exhibited by young children or the moral concepts endorsed by different
cultures. In summary, the above beliefs ultimately lead to the congruence of morality and well-being, where “good is rewarded
with good, and evil with evil.”
Although research on justice beliefs can partially describe beliefs about the morality-well-being relationship, it also has
shortcomings. First, the belief in a just world describes the simple notion of proportional retribution, but on the one hand,
it oversimplifies the consideration of the morality-well-being relationship, failing to further explore the various possible
connections between the two; on the other hand, the meaning of “proportional retribution” is broader than “congruence of
morality and well-being,” encompassing non-moral domains (e.g., work rewards, interpersonal emotions). Supernatural justice
beliefs (including beliefs in God and karma) focus on explaining and supporting “congruence of morality and well-being”
through supernatural mechanisms, thus emphasizing the nature of the supernatural mechanisms themselves rather than the
content of the morality-well-being relationship. For example, beliefs in God view God as personal, omniscient, omnipotent,
moralized, monotheistic or polytheistic, strict or lenient; beliefs in karma focus on the operation of karma, such as reincarnation,
balancing merits and demerits, but the descriptions of the morality-well-being relationship often remain general concepts.
Second, justice beliefs focus only on the moral cognitive aspect of “justice” or “fairness.” However, in both ethics and moral
psychology, the concept of “justice” is only a part of moral cognition, not encompassing all moral thinking and practice.
Furthermore, daily experiences and philosophical thoughts often associate morality with inner well-being states such as peace,
harmony, and satisfaction. Since justice beliefs focus on the fairness between external behavior and rewards, they often fail to
consider related aspects of BCG.
To better understand people’s BCG, this article proposes a psychological conceptual model of “multi-dimensional beliefs
about congruent good” (MBCG). This model divides BCG into four fundamental constructs: Internal congruence, external
congruence, positive congruence, and negative congruence. “Internal congruence” refers to the degree to which one believes in
the congruence between morality and internal well-being; “external congruence” refers to the degree to which one believes in
the congruence between morality and external well-being; “positive congruence” refers to the degree to which one believes that
doing good enhances well-being; “negative congruence” refers to the degree to which one believes that doing evil harms wellbeing.
These four fundamental constructs can be further combined into four composite beliefs: Internal positive congruence,
internal negative congruence, external positive congruence, and external negative congruence.
We believe that the psychological conceptual model of MBCG can not only supplement the deficiencies of existing theories
but also explain richer psychological and behavioral phenomena and serve as a reference for practical applications. This article
illustrates three issues as examples: MBCG moderates the relationship between hedonic and eudaimonic well-being, the
integration of multiple moral motivation aspects using MBCG, and MBCG buffering the victim-blaming effect of the belief in
a just world. Additionally, we further propose hypotheses about the relationships between MBCG and several psychological
or behavioral variables as a theoretical basis for subsequent empirical research to test criterion-related validity. These include
morality-related variables: The belief in a just world, moral identity, altruism, moral foundation, moral disengagement, and
well-being-related variables: Resilience, forgiveness, and revenge. In summary, the psychological conceptual model of “multi-dimensional beliefs about congruent good” proposed in this
article can compensate for the deficiencies of existing theories and more clearly understand people’s various beliefs about
the relationship between morality and well-being in daily life. Applying the conceptual model of “multi-dimensional beliefs
about congruent good” to make inferences can help clarify the confusion or contradictions in existing theories. In the future,
measurement instruments for the psychological conceptual model of “multi-dimensional beliefs about congruent good” can
be developed, and the relationships and mechanisms between beliefs about congruent good and other moral psyche and
behavior can be explored. This will provide a more comprehensive understanding of many related psychological and behavioral
phenomena and can further offer practical recommendations for moral practice and education.
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Contemplation of Morality and Well-Being: Theoretical Construction of Multi-Dimensional Beliefs about Congruent Good
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